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Rushing et al.: Updates from the International Criminal Courts

UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
On September 27, 2006, tribunal judges
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentenced
Momailo Krajisnik to 27 years imprisonment.
Krajisnik, a former Bosnian-Serb leader, was
convicted of persecutions, murder, extermination, deportation, and forced transfer of nonSerb civilians. After establishing the existence
of a joint criminal enterprise intended to
reduce the proportion of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats, the judges found that
Krajisnik’s role in the crimes was “crucial”
because of his senior position. The Trial
Chamber acquitted Krajisnik of genocide,
complicity in genocide, and one count of
murder as a violation of the laws or customs
of war, noting that he did not have the specific intent necessary for genocide.
On May 3, 2006, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber affirmed the sentences for Mladen
Nalelitic (“Tuta”), and Vinko Martinovic
(“Stela”). Naletilic was found guilty on eight
counts of crimes against humanity and war
crimes and Martinovic was found guilty on
nine counts of crimes against humanity. The
judges dismissed most of the appeals pertaining to issues of due process, evidence, and
crimes involved in the trial of the two Bosnian
Croats. The Chamber found that, given the
particular circumstances of the case and the
defendants’ degree of participation, the sentences of 20 and 18 years’ imprisonment were
reasonable. Both men had served as military
commanders in the Mostar region of Croatia
between April 1993 and January 1994.
On June 30, 2006, the ICTY Trial
Chamber sentenced Naser Oric, former senior commander of Bosnian Muslim forces, to
two years’ imprisonment. Oric was convicted
for failing to exercise command responsibility
to prevent the murder and cruel treatment of
numerous Serb prisoners in the former UN
“safe area.” ICTY judges described the conditions in and around Srebrenica, Oric’s
perimeter of command, at the time of the
crimes in 1992 and 1993 as more abysmal
than any other case before the Tribunal. The
judges convicted Oric because he had reason to
know about the murders and cruel treatment
but failed to take “necessary and reasonable
measures” to prevent their occurrence.

The month of July brought with it two new
trials for the ICTY. In Popovic, et al., seven senior Bosnian Serb military and police officers
will face charges of genocide and various crimes
against humanity for acts committed in
Srebrenica. In Milutinovic, et al. the Tribunal
will try six former high-level political and military leaders of Serbia and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY), charged with alleged
crimes committed in Kosovo during 1999.

International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) Appeals Chamber delivered
a landmark decision on June 16, 2006, in the
case of Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse
and Nzirorera. The opinion recognized that
genocide occurred in Rwanda during the period of April 6 to July 17, 1994 — holding that
the genocide is now a matter of “common
knowledge.” This opinion has now indisputably established Rwanda’s genocide in the
ICTR’s jurisprudence. The Karemera decision
is significant because it removes the requirement of proving genocide in every case,
silencing the rejectionist camp. The decision
will have a significant impact on future defendants accused of genocide by eliminating the
perpetual relitigation of the established historical fact of Rwanda’s genocide.
On September 12, 2006, Trial Chamber I
acquitted Jean Mpambara, former mayor of
the Rukara commune in Rwanda. Mpambara
was accused of planning, directing and facilitating attacks against Tutsi civilians. The
Chamber held that the prosecution failed to
prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
In acquitting Mpambara, Judge Jai Ram
Reddy said that the evidence establishing his
instigation and assistance in the attacks was
not credible. Further, the Chamber held that
on occasion Mpambara’s inaction was due to
a lack of resources for an effective defense
against the attackers. Residents of the former
Rukara commune have expressed disappointment over the acquittal.
In another ruling the same week, the ICTR
sentenced Tharcisse Muvunyi to 25 years for
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and rape as a crime against
humanity. Muvunyi was a former commander
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of Ecole Sous-Officiers (ESO), a military academy in Butare, southern Rwanda. Soldiers
under Muvunyi’s command attacked between
800 and 5,000 Tutsi refugees in the Mukura
Forest in April 1994. The court held that
Muvunyi failed to use his authority to prevent
his soldiers from participating in the genocide.
Finally, former education minister André
Rwamakuba was unanimously acquitted on
September 20, 2006, and immediately
released. Rwamakuba had been charged with
conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement of
or complicity to commit genocide, as well as
several crimes against humanity, serious violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions, and violations of Additional
Protocol II. The Chamber found that testimony demonstrated that Rwamakuba was not
present at the time and location of the alleged
events. Additionally, some of the prosecution’s
evidence was based on hearsay; hence, the
prosecution did not meet its burden to prove
the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a related development, on September
18, 2006, the ICTR accepted the resignation
of Callixte Gakwaya, a defence attorney at the
ICTR accused of having participated in the
genocide. Previously, Rwanda had shown
concern over Gakawaya’s involvement in the
ICTR, and threatened to cease cooperation
with the court unless he was fired. Gakwaya is
listed as one of 12 genocide suspects
employed at the ICTR. According to the
ICTR, only two of these suspects are still
employed and they are both currently under
investigation.

Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v.
The Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A
On July 6, 2006, the Appeals Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judgment in the
case of Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor. From
1983 through 1994 Sylvestre Gacumbitsi
served as the highest-ranking local administrative official, or bourgmestre, of Rusumo
Commune. On June 17, 2004, ICTR Trial
Chamber III found Gacumbitsi guilty of genocide and the crimes of humanity of extermination and rape due to his role in organizing and
executing a campaign against the Tutsi popula-
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tion in Rusumo Commune in April 1994.
Gacumbitsi received a thirty-year sentence.
Both Gacumbitsi and the Prosecutor
appealed the conviction. The Appeals
Chamber dismissed all of Gacumbitsi’s
grounds of appeal. It granted the Prosecutor’s
appeal in part, finding Gacumbitsi guilty of
aiding and abetting the murder (as a crime
against humanity) of two of his female Tutsi
tenants. Additionally, while the Trial
Chamber held that Gacumbitsi’s authority for
ordering the crimes committed in Nyarubuye
Parish on April 15, 16, and 17 and in
Kigarama on April 14 was limited to the communal police, the Appeals Chamber found
that it also extended to several other groups of
attackers. Based on these additional findings,
the Appeals Chamber quashed the Trial
Chamber’s thirty-year sentence and imposed a
new life sentence.

Gacumbitsi’s Appeal:
“Committing” Genocide
The Trial Chamber convicted Gacumbitsi
of planning, instigating, ordering, committing, and aiding and abetting the crime of
genocide pursuant to Article 6(1) of the
Statute of the ICTR. In claiming that his conviction for “committing” genocide was based
in errors of both law and fact, Gacumbitsi
argued, inter alia, that the indictment did not
allege his personal participation in the killing
of Murefu, a Tutsi refugee, with sufficient
specificity. Because the indictment merely
alleged as a general matter that Gacumbitsi
was responsible for killing “members of the
Tutsi population,” the Appeals Chamber
found that Gacumbitsi could not have reasonably known on this basis alone that he was
being charged with killing Murefu.
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber found
that a witness statement disclosed before trial
provided “timely, clear, and consistent information” about the time, place, and manner of
the killing and thus, sufficiently cured the
defective indictment.
Presiding Judge Shahabuddeen wrote separately to argue that the Appeals Chamber
imposed “too formulaic” pleading requirements on the Prosecution and should not
have found the indictment defective with
respect to the killing of Murefu because the
crime of genocide does not require the pleading of every individual killing. Judge
Shahabudeen stressed the distinction between
material facts necessary to establish an offense
and the evidence offered to prove those facts,
remarking that:

The material facts must be pleaded, the
evidence need not. When an indictment alleges genocide, proof of any one
killing is not a material fact as it would
be in the case of murder; it is evidence
of a material fact, namely that the
intent of the accused was the destruction of a group, as a group.
In contrast, Judges Liu and Meron wrote
separately to argue that the Chamber had
been too lenient in finding that a “vague
chart-entry summarizing the anticipated testimony of one witness” cured the indictment.
Notably, the Appeals Chamber determined that even if the killing of Murefu was
set aside, the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that
Gacumbitsi “committed” genocide would still
be valid. This decision was based on witness
allegations that Gacumbitsi arrived at a
church in Nyarubuye Parish with a pick-up
truck full of machetes, ordered the Hutus to
separate from the Tutsis, and instructed the
Hutus and Interahamwe: “Get machetes! Start
killing and surround the church so no one
escapes.” From these facts, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that Gacumbitsi “directed” and “played a leading role in conducting
and especially, supervising” the Nyarubuye
massacre and that Gacumbitsi’s act of separating the crowd was as much an integral part of
the genocide as were the killings that it
enabled. The Appeals Chamber thus determined that Gacumbitsi’s conviction was
appropriately characterized to include his
“commission” of genocide. To this end, the
Appeals Chamber held that in the context of
genocide, “direct and physical perpetration”
need not mean physical killing — other acts,
such as directing or supervising killings, can
constitute the actus reus of the crime.

Prosecutor’s Appeal: Murder As a
Crime Against Humanity
The Prosecutor appealed Gacumbitsi’s
acquittal for the murder as a crime against
humanity of Marie and Beatrice, two of his
Tutsi tenants. The Prosecutor advanced the
theory that Gacumbitsi aided and abetted
their murder, a mode of responsibility not
considered by the Trial Chamber. The Appeals
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber
entered sufficient findings of fact to support a
conviction under this theory of liability,
including that Gacumbitsi expelled the
women from his home in the context of the
genocidal campaign in which he was involved,
that he knew expelling them under these circumstances would expose them to the risk of
being attacked on the grounds of their ethnic39

ity, and that they were subsequently killed.
The language of the indictment was sufficiently clear for the Appeals Chamber to find
that the accused had ample timely notice of
this charge. The Appeals Chamber therefore
entered a new conviction for aiding and abetting the crime against humanity of murder.

Prosecutor’s Appeal: Rape As a
Crime Against Humanity
The Trial Chamber convicted Gacumbitsi
for eight counts of rape. However, it acquitted
him on three additional counts after finding
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
Gacumbitsi had instigated the crimes. The
Prosecutor argued that the Trial Chamber
“erred in law by requiring it to establish that
the Appellant’s instigation was a condition sin
qua non of the commission of the rapes” and
that it should have convicted Gacumbitsi on
this basis, or in the alternative, for his Article
6(3) superior responsibility for the perpetrators.
The Appeals Chamber found that the
Trial Chamber had applied the correct legal
standard, noting that to convict someone of
instigation it is sufficient for the Prosecution
to demonstrate that “the instigation was a factor substantially contributing to the conduct
of another person committing the crime,” and
that “it is not necessary to prove the crime
would not have been perpetrated without the
involvement of the accused.” Moreover,
despite the Trial Chamber’s findings that
Gacumbitsi drove around Nyarubuye Parish
with a megaphone inciting Hutu men to rape
and kill Tutsis and that a victim claimed one
of her rapists told her Gacumbitsi had ordered
the rape of Tutsi females, the Appeals
Chamber held that the Prosecution did not
prove the presence of a nexus between the
instigation and the rapes beyond a reasonable
doubt. In making this determination, the
Appeals Chamber cited a lack of credible witness testimony and a lack of evidence that
Gacumbitsi’s words substantially contributed
the three rapes, noting in particular that the
Prosecutor did not establish the perpetrators’
awareness of Gacumbitsi’s inciting statements.
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber agreed
with the Prosecutor that the Trial Chamber
had a duty to consider in the alternative
whether Gacumbitsi had Article 6(3) superior
responsibility for these rapes. The Trial
Chamber did not make any formal legal finding on this question, stating that it did not
“deem it necessary to enquire whether
[Gacumbitsi] is equally responsible pursuant
to Article 6(3) … given the similarity of the
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acts charged and the lack [of ] evidence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the
Accused and the perpetrators of the rapes.”
After looking at the relevant evidence, the
Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial
Chamber that the Prosecution failed to offer
sufficiently specific facts demonstrating
Gacumbitsi’s effective control over the perpetrators of the rapes in question, and therefore
denied the Prosecution’s appeal on this count.
The Prosecution also sought general clarification on the elements of rape as a crime
against humanity. The Prosecution argued
that in such a context, non-consent of the victim and the perpetrator’s knowledge of that
non-consent should not be considered elements of the offense to be proved, but rather
that consent should be considered an affirmative defense. The Prosecutor reasoned that
when prosecuted at the ICTR, rape will
always take place in the context of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes. There
should therefore be no need to prove the
absence of consent, as is the case with other
crimes in the statute such as torture. The
Appeals Chamber reiterated the definition of
the rape as a crime against humanity provided
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the
Kunarac et al. judgment, and found that it
established non-consent and knowledge thereof as elements that the Prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, to prove
the element of non-consent, the Prosecution
need not provide evidence of the victim’s
words or conduct, or evidence of force, but
need only demonstrate the existence of coercive circumstances under which meaningful
consent is not possible, i.e., the existence of a
genocidal campaign or a situation of detention. Further, the Prosecution can establish
knowledge of non-consent by proving the
accused was aware, or had reason to be aware,
of the coercive circumstances that undermined
the possibility of genuine consent.
To rebut an allegation of non-consent, the
accused may enter evidence that the victim
consented, but such evidence is inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 96(ii) if the victim “has been
subjected to or threatened with or has reason
to fear violence, duress, detention, or psychological oppression,” or “reasonably believed
that if [one] did not submit, another might be
so subjected, threatened, or put in fear.”
Moreover, the Trial Chamber is free to disregard evidence of consent if it concludes that
consent cannot be given voluntarily under the
circumstances.

Prosecutor’s Appeal:
Joint Criminal Enterprise
The Prosecution also argued Gacumbitsi
should have been found responsible for his
crimes under the theory of joint criminal
enterprise (JCE). The Appeals Chamber disagreed, citing the ICTY appeal judgment in
Kvocka and holding that the Prosecutor’s failure to plead the category of JCE alleged and
the supporting material facts in the indictment
constituted a defect that neither the
Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief nor its opening
statement cured. In a separate opinion, Judge
Shahabuddeen argued that the Prosecutor had
provided the requisite notice. In his view,
although the words “joint criminal enterprise”
were not used in the indictment, the use of
terms such as “acting in concert with others” in
pursuit of a “common purpose” meaningfully
informed Gacumbitsi of the JCE charge and
enabled him to prepare an effective defense.

Prosecutor’s Appeal:
Authority for Ordering
In its judgment, the Trial Chamber found
that Gacumbitsi ordered the crimes committed by the communal policemen in his commune, but that he did not have the authority
to order the crimes committed there by the
conseillers, gendarmes, soldiers, and
Interahamwe. The Prosecution appealed this
finding, alleging both an error of fact and an
error of law. The Appeals Chamber found
that the Trial Chamber correctly defined
“ordering” to take place when someone in a
position of authority instructs another to
commit an offense. Moreover, “[n]o formal
superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused and the perpetrator is required. It is
sufficient that there is proof of some position
of authority on the part of the accused that
would compel another to commit a crime in
following the accused’s order.”
Although it upheld the Trial Chamber’s
citation of the relevant law, the Appeals
Chamber found error with the Trial
Chamber’s characterization of the relevant
facts. Specifically, it recalled the Trial
Chamber’s finding that as bourgmestre,
Gacumbitsi was the “highest authority and
most influential person on the commune,
with the power to take legal measures binding
all residents.” The Appeals Chamber then
pointed to four consecutive days in April of
1994 where the Trial Chamber found that
Gacumbitsi “instructed,” “ordered,” or
“directed” groups of assailants — not just the
communal policemen — to attack many Tutsi
40

civilians. For example, the Trial Chamber
found that in Nyarubuye parish on April 16,
1994, Gacumbitsi “directed” an attack during
which a group of assailants killed survivors
and looted the parish building. According to
the Appeals Chamber, these findings proved
Gacumbitsi’s authority over all the attackers
in question and that his orders had a substantial and direct effect on the commission of
those crimes. It consequently upheld this subground of the Prosecutor’s appeal.

Prosecutor’s Appeal: Sentencing
The Prosecution alleged that the Trial
Chamber erred in failing to impose a sentence
reflecting the gravity of the crimes and
Gacumbitsi’s degree of criminal culpability.
While the Appeals Chamber held that the
Trial Chamber properly stated the relevant
sentencing principles, it argued that those
principles were applied incorrectly. The
Appeals Chamber noted that “Gacumbitsi
played a central role in planning, instigating,
ordering, committing, and aiding and abetting genocide and extermination in his commune of Rusumo, where thousands of Tutsis
were killed or seriously harmed.” Citing
Gacumbitsi’s instigation of particularly sadistic rapes, the absence of significant mitigating
circumstances, and its findings on appeal, the
Appeals Chamber quashed Gacumbitsi’s thirty-year prison sentence and imposed a life
sentence in its place.

International
Criminal Court
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubang
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06
The International Criminal Court’s (ICC)
first trial entered the pre-trial phase, but
is encountering some difficulty. Chief
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo brought
charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
for crimes committed in his capacity as
founder and leader of the Union of Congolese
Patriots (UPC) and its military wing, the
Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of the
Congo (FPLC). The ICC investigation commenced in June 2004, two months after the
DRC government referred the situation to the
Court. Early in 2005 the government arrested
Lubanga on charges of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. In March
2006 the ICC issued an arrest warrant charging Lubanga with the war crimes of enlisting,
conscripting, and using children to partici-
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pate in active hostilities. The DRC government immediately transferred Lubanga to
ICC custody in the Hague. Several days later,
he appeared before Pre-Trial Chamber I for
initial proceedings.
The confirmation hearing, in which the
Pre-Trial Chamber seeks to confirm whether
there is sufficient evidence for the Prosecutor
to conduct a trial, was originally scheduled for
June 2006. The Court postponed the hearings
until September due to escalating violence in
Ituri, the site of Lubanga’s alleged crimes. The
Prosecutor delayed full disclosure of evidence
to the defense, due partially to the escalating
violence and in the interest of protecting victims and witnesses. In September the defense
team requested more time to analyze the
recently disclosed evidence and prepare a relevant defense. The Prosecutor requested a time
extension as well. The Court subsequently
announced that the confirmation hearing
would take place on November 9, 2006.
The Court reached an impasse in June
when the Prosecutor announced that, due to
the violence in Ituri, he would temporarily
stop the investigation. Thus, the charging
document only accuses Lubanga of enlistment, conscription, and use of child soldiers;
the Prosecutor decided that he would not add
or amend other charges. While the conscription and recruitment of child soldiers in many
ways facilitated these crimes, the fact remains
that in the past six years, 60,000 people have
been slaughtered in Ituri alone (according to
United Nations estimates). The UPC/FPLC
and other parties to the conflict committed
mass murder, rape, and torture, crimes not
addressed in Lubanga’s charges. According to
the most recent Report on Prosecutorial
Strategy, in the interest of expediency, the
Prosecutor may have decided to select a limited number of incidents for the arrest warrants; however, he has also committed to
ensuring that those incidents will reflect the
gravity of the accused’s crimes. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contend
that by excluding grave crimes such as sexual
violence, rape, willful killings, and summary
executions, the Court is sending the message
that perpetrators of those crimes will go
unpunished. Impunity for gender crimes is
considered especially troublesome.
The Prosecutor also faces increasing pressure to issue arrest warrants for members of
other parties to the conflict. The conflict
between the Hema ethnic group, represented
by Lubanga’s FPLC forces, and the Lendu

ethnic group, represented by Floribert Njabu’s
Front for National Integration forces, spread
and became integrated into the larger regional conflict, and thus has many parties. Since
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) suspended its investigation in the DRC due to security threats, Lubanga is the only individual that
has been charged.

Update on the Uganda Situation
A year after the ICC unsealed its first
arrest warrants, there have still been no arrests
in Uganda. The Prosecutor, in his most recent
report on Uganda, identified executing arrest
warrants as one of the central challenges facing the Court. In September, Pre-Trial
Chamber II requested that the Prosecutor
submit a report on the status of arrests in
Uganda, and the court reviewed the report in
early October. One of the most significant
setbacks occurred in July 2006, when Joseph
Kony, indicted leader of the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), initiated peace talks with the
government of Uganda. Kony proposed an
end to hostilities in exchange for amnesty to
all LRA combatants. The government granted
his request and signed the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement with the LRA on
August 26. The amnesties have raised the
question whether, in the interest of peace, the
ICC should withdraw the arrest warrants.
This is particularly relevant because Kony has
refused to appear in public to advance the
peace talks unless the ICC drops all charges
against the LRA.
NGOs have campaigned on both sides of
the issue in a debate commentators have
termed “Peace vs. Justice.” Proponents of an
ICC withdrawal point to the merits of the traditional Acholi justice mechanism, which
involves public ceremonies of confession and
forgiveness, because it affords victims personalized truth and reconciliation. Many fear that
if the ICC moves forward with the arrests, the
LRA will abandon the peace talks and resume
the violence. Groups advocating for the ICC
to continue its investigation (including the
ICC itself ) invoke international law, which
disallows amnesties for the grave crimes under
investigation. In the past, exchanging amnesty
for peace agreements has not been successful.
For example, the amnesty of Sierra Leone
rebel leader Foday Sankoh backfired and
plunged the parties into deeper conflict.
Furthermore, States Parties to the ICC (of
which Uganda is one) are not permitted to
renege on their referral of a situation to the
ICC. Traditional Acholi justice mechanisms
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also conflict with the traditions of non-Acholi
groups similarly affected by the conflict.
The Prosecutor’s recent report states that,
contrary to some media reports, Ugandan
President Yoweri Museveni has not requested
that the Court withdraw its arrest warrants.
The Ugandan government reportedly submitted a confidential letter to the Registry confirming its commitment to cooperate with the
Court, and expressing its desire to conduct
peace talks in a manner compatible with its
obligations as a State Party. As stated in the
report, the Prosecutor aims to continue investigations in a manner that will not disrupt the
peace negotiations.

Update on Darfur
On June 14, 2006, pursuant to Resolution
1593, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo presented
his third report to the UN Security Council.
He highlighted developments in the OTP’s
ongoing investigation of the situation in
Darfur. Since the investigation commenced in
June 2005, the OTP has conducted over 50
missions in 15 countries, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, and reviewed thousands of
documents.
The ongoing violence has made it
extremely difficult to collect information
while ensuring the safety of victims, witnesses, and ICC staff. Sudanese President Omar
al-Bashir has also stated that the ICC cannot
conduct investigations inside Sudan. Due to
these concerns, the Prosecutor has not conducted investigations in Sudan, instead relying on witnesses and information located outside of Sudan. Critics suggest that this concession to the Government of Sudan compromised the Court’s neutrality, as the government is a party to the conflict and is therefore
subject to ICC investigation. The question
also remains whether an effective investigation is possible without entering the area in
which the atrocities took place.
The Prosecutor’s report also addressed the
willingness and ability of the Special Criminal
Court on the Events in Darfur to prosecute
crimes in Darfur and provide justice to the
victims. The Government of Sudan established the Special Court soon after the
Security Council referred the situation to the
ICC. Critics claim the Special Court is a contrivance designed to forestall ICC prosecutions. In February and June 2006, the OTP
visited Khartoum to assess the Special Court
proceedings in order to determine admissibility of possible cases before the ICC. The OTP
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found evidence that the Special Court was not
willing or able to investigate or prosecute
crimes against humanity or war crimes, which
are the focus of the ICC’s investigations.
To date the Special Court has only conducted thirteen trials. The cases involved lowranking offenders who committed minor
offenses such as theft. The court has not
addressed war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by Janjaweed, government, and rebel forces. NGOs report that the
Special Court grants immunity to members of
military and police forces, and does not recognize the doctrine of command responsibility,
making prosecution of high-ranking officials
unlikely. Victims, particularly those subjected
to sexual violence, cannot complain for fear of
further harassment. Based on the Special
Court’s limited caseload, the Prosecutor
believes the cases under investigation are
admissible to the Court.
The Prosecutor has identified several specific cases for investigation and possible prosecution, but has not yet prepared arrest warrants. The delay indicates an ongoing effort to
identify individuals with the greatest responsibility for the crimes, identified by factors such
as the scale, nature, and impact of the crimes.
The Prosecutor’s task is complicated by the
ongoing violence and the lack of cooperation
from the Government of Sudan, whose continued intransigence promises to further delay
investigation of crimes and ultimately prevent
the apprehension of perpetrators.

Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia
Judges and Prosecutors Appointed
On May 7, 2006, by Royal Decree
NS/RKT/0506/214,
King
Norodom
Sihamoni appointed 17 national and 12 international judges and prosecutors to serve on
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea (Extraordinary Chambers). The
Cambodian Supreme Council of the
Magistracy had previously selected the
appointees on May 4, 2006. The government
stated that the Supreme Council of the
Magistracy had followed proper guidelines for
selecting candidates using mandatory criteria
in the Establishment Law. These include:
evaluating language ability and inter-cultural
sensitivity; seeking a balance between candidates’ experience and formal education; taking into consideration gender and ethnic rep-

resentation; and assessing candidates’ ability to
operate in a modern court environment. By
position, those appointed are:
Trial Chamber judges: Mr. Nil Nonn
(Cambodia), Mr. Thou Mony
(Cambodia), Mr. Ya Sokhan
(Cambodia), Ms. Silvia Cartwright
(New Zealand), and Mr. Jean-Marc
Lavergne (France). The reserve judges
in the Trial Chamber are Mr. You
Ottara (Cambodia) and Ms. Claudia
Fenz (Austria).
Supreme Court Chamber judges: H.E.
Kong Srim (Cambodia), Mr. Som
Sereyvuth (Cambodia), Mr. Sin Rith
(Cambodia),
Mr.
Ya
Narin
(Cambodia), Mr. Motoo Noguchi
(Japan) Ms. Agnieszka KlonowieckaMilart (Poland), and Mr. Chandra
Nihal Jayasinghe (Sri Lanka). The
reserve judges in the Supreme Court
Chamber are Mr. Mong Monichariya
(Cambodia) and Mr. Martin Karopkin
(USA).
Co-investigating judges: Mr. You Bun
Leng (Cambodia), Marcel Lemonde
(France). The reserve co-investigating
judges are Mr. Thong Ol (Cambodia)
and an international judge (to be
announced).
Co-prosecutors: Ms. Chea Leang
(Cambodia) and Mr. Robert Petit
(Canada). Reserve co-prosecutors are
H.E. Chuon Sun Leng (Cambodia)
and Mr. Paul Coffey (USA).
Pre-Trial Chamber judges: H.E. Prak
Kimsan (Cambodia), H.E. Ney Thol
(Cambodia), Mr. Hout Vuthy
(Cambodia), Mr. Rowan Downing
(Australia), and Ms. Katinka Lahuis
(Netherlands). The reserve judge in
the Pre-Trial Chamber is Mr. Pen
Pichsaly (Cambodia).

internal regulations, and a Judicial
Administration Committee to deal with issues
relating to the administration of the
Extraordinary Chambers, including the infrastructure of the Chambers, protocol concerns,
and physical and human resource needs.
The Extraordinary Chambers officially
began its operations on July 10, when
Cambodian co-prosecutor Chea Leang and
international co-prosecutor Robert Petit
(Canada) commenced their formal investigation into crimes falling within the Chamber’s
jurisdiction. These include: genocide, crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, destruction of cultural
property, crimes against internationally protected persons, and various domestic crimes
under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code. On
September 4, the two co-investigating judges,
Marcel LeMonde (France) and You Bun Leng
(Cambodia), started their work in Phnom
Penh. They are tasked with questioning suspects and victims, hearing witness testimony,
and collecting evidence. Principle Defender
Rupert Skilbeck (United Kingdom) has negotiated an informal agreement with
Cambodian stakeholders that would allow
international defense counsel to fully participate in all proceedings related to the representation of accused, although the methods to
ensure that this occurs are subject to further
negotiation. Skilbeck will begin his work in
October 2006.
While the Extraordinary Chambers is making rapid progress in its efforts to become fully
operational, many concerns have yet to be
addressed. A memorandum dated October 4,
from the Open Society Justice Initiative to the
Group of Interested States (GIS) — a coalition
of nations assisting the Extraordinary
Chambers — highlighted several outstanding
issues. These included: supplementing the
annual budget, adopting clear rules of procedure, fostering judicial leadership and cooperation, strengthening investigative independence
and capacity, and enhancing the Extraordinary
Chambers’ outreach and victim support.

The Cambodian and international judges
and prosecutors were sworn in during a ceremony at Phnom Penh's Silver Pagoda in the
royal palace on July 3. Trial chamber judge
Sylvia Cartwright and reserve co-prosecutor
Paul Coffey were reportedly unable to attend
the event. Reserve judges Claudia Fenz and
Martin Karopkin will only take an oath if
they are called into duty from reserve status.

Defendant Indicted for
War Crimes Dies

During a week-long workshop in July, the
judges agreed to adopt internal regulations to
supplement Cambodian procedure, to guide
the work of the Chambers, and to ensure
compliance with international standards of
due process and justice. The judges also established a Rules Committee to draft proposed

On July 21, 2006, Ung Chheun, also
known as Ta Mok, died at the age of 80. Ta
Mok was a notorious military commander of
the Khmer Rouge commonly known as “the
butcher.” He had been in military detention
since March 1999, when the government of
Cambodia indicted him for crimes against
domestic security and genocide. Since then,
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the government renewed his detention order
each year in apparent anticipation of his prosecution in the Extraordinary Chambers.

The Iraqi High Criminal Court
(Formerly the Iraqi Special
Tribunal)
The trial of Saddam Hussein and six others charged with genocide continued after a
three week break between August 23 and
September 11. The Iraqi High Criminal
Court previously heard testimony from survivors of the “Anfal Campaign” against Iraqi
Kurds. Witnesses testified that over 180,000
Kurds died in chemical and other attacks
against the Kurdish population in 1987.
Hussein and seven others have already been
tried for the killing of 148 Kurds in Dujail in
1982. A verdict on the Dujail segment of the
trial, originally due in October 2006, was
deferred to allow defense lawyers to submit
written documents and for the court to review
additional evidence.

On September 13 Chief Prosecutor
Munqith al-Faroon accused Chief Judge
Abdullah al-Amiri of bias in the proceedings
and called for him to step down after al-Amiri
stated that Hussein was “not a dictator.” AlFaroon had previously made this request on
grounds that al-Amiri was biased towards the
defense. Acting on Al-Faroon’s petition, on
September 19 the cabinet of the Prime
Minister asked the court to remove al-Amiri
as Chief Judge. Judge Mohammad al-Khalifa,
who previously served as Deputy Chief Judge
of the court, was selected as al-Amiri’s replacement. Saddam Hussein, however, refused to
recognize al-Khalifa’s authority as Chief
Judge, resulting in Hussein’s ejection from the
court. Hussein’s defense counsel then walked
out in protest and vowed not to return until
the government stopped “interfering” in the
trial. A previous Chief Judge, Rizgar
Muhammad Amin, resigned last January,
also citing government interference as a
main frustration.
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On November 5, 2006, Judge Rauf Abdel
Rahman sentenced Saddam Hussein to death
by hanging for crimes against humanity.
Though Hussein and his co-defendants will
be permitted to appeal the convictions, the
appeals are unlikely to be successful. HRB
Elizabeth J. Rushing, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the ICTY and
ICTR for the Human Rights Brief.
Nick Leddy, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, wrote the Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The
Prosecutor summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Anne Heindel, Assistant Director of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law,
edited the Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor
summary for the Human Rights Brief
Angela Edman, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the International Criminal
Court for the Human Rights Brief.
Bjorn Sorenson, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers international criminal issues
for the Human Rights Brief.

